Cirrus down.. all is good.

2000agl is the max at which Cirrus says you need BTW. At a recent audit, talking to the factory boys they say in straight and level flight you can pull as low as 500AGL. Our call outs have changed because of it. We now use "500 feet, CAPS, flaps and maps."

Yes, 500 AGL is the minimum, which is a critical altitude for deployment after takeoff.

The 2000 AGL altitude was taught to me as the "minimum decision altitude" when gliding down after a loss of power above 2000 AGL. Turn towards an airport, troubleshoot the problem, etc., but if you can't either restore power or be certain you'll be gliding safely onto a runway by the time you reach 2000 AGL, it's time to stop focusing on the problem and initiate a CAPS deployment.

Incidentally, this is not much different from sport skydiving. In the event of a problem with the main canopy, skydivers will usually try to troubleshoot down to a "decision altitude" of about 2000 feet, give or take a few hundred. If the problem can't be resolved, it's time to cutaway the main canopy and deploy the reserve. The reserve canopy *could* work much lower than 2000 AGL (it only takes a few hundred feet to inflate), but there needs to be a definite, safe altitude to stop messing around and go to the reserve when you know it will work for sure. Same principle applies to Cirrus.
 
Yes, 500 AGL is the minimum, which is a critical altitude for deployment after takeoff.

The 2000 AGL altitude was taught to me as the "minimum decision altitude" when gliding down after a loss of power above 2000 AGL. Turn towards an airport, troubleshoot the problem, etc., but if you can't either restore power or be certain you'll be gliding safely onto a runway by the time you reach 2000 AGL, it's time to stop focusing on the problem and initiate a CAPS deployment.

Incidentally, this is not much different from sport skydiving. In the event of a problem with the main canopy, skydivers will usually try to troubleshoot down to a "decision altitude" of about 2000 feet, give or take a few hundred. If the problem can't be resolved, it's time to cutaway the main canopy and deploy the reserve. The reserve canopy *could* work much lower than 2000 AGL (it only takes a few hundred feet to inflate), but there needs to be a definite, safe altitude to stop messing around and go to the reserve when you know it will work for sure. Same principle applies to Cirrus.


Thanks! Great explanation! I remember I had asked on APC forums about the chute pulling mentality and training procedures on Cirrus aircraft. I was really triggered by an article on Avweb.com about a guy who pulled his chute on his Cirrus. I believe it was in New Zealand or Australia. Nonetheless, the picture in the article showed the Cirrus sitting in a *flat, open* field. That picture and what seemed to be an immediate reach for the chute piqued my interest. My purpose is not to Monday morning quarterback anyone.

I am curious about how the retrofit chutes are doing operationally. I believe at least 172s and 182s are able to be fitted with them.
 
I remember I had asked on APC forums about the chute pulling mentality and training procedures on Cirrus aircraft. I was really triggered by an article on Avweb.com about a guy who pulled his chute on his Cirrus. I believe it was in New Zealand or Australia. Nonetheless, the picture in the article showed the Cirrus sitting in a *flat, open* field. That picture and what seemed to be an immediate reach for the chute piqued my interest.

Yes, I remember the incident you're talking about, and I remember thinking the same thing, before I went through CSIP training.

The key point to keep in mind is that the chute is almost always a sure bet. When deployed within its design parameters (<133 knots and >500 AGL) everyone has always survived. Landing in a field, no matter how open it appears, is not as good. There might be fences, power lines, ditches, deep mud, or any number of obstacles that might cause a fatality when hit at 60-70 knots, typical SR22 touchdown speeds--and the pilot might not see them until they're below 500 AGL, when it's too late for a CAPS deployment.

I believe that's how Cirrus arrived at their 2000 foot decision altitude. They don't want pilots gliding down super low, only to find the field they'd planned on isn't suitable for landing. Making an "Is this field good or not?" decision is pretty tough, especially above 500 feet. Making a "Will I be able to land on a runway or not?" decision is relatively easy. That's why you'll occasionally see a Cirrus parachute into a wide open field...because at 2000 AGL, the pilot was sure of a CAPS deployment, but wasn't sure of hidden obstacles in the field.
 
Ill take pulling the chute and looking like a tool any day over running out of altitude, airspeed, and ideas, and looking like a dead tool.
 
Thanks! Great explanation! I remember I had asked on APC forums about the chute pulling mentality and training procedures on Cirrus aircraft. I was really triggered by an article on Avweb.com about a guy who pulled his chute on his Cirrus. I believe it was in New Zealand or Australia. Nonetheless, the picture in the article showed the Cirrus sitting in a *flat, open* field. That picture and what seemed to be an immediate reach for the chute piqued my interest. My purpose is not to Monday morning quarterback anyone.

I am curious about how the retrofit chutes are doing operationally. I believe at least 172s and 182s are able to be fitted with them.

I have an acquaintance who is alive because he had installed a chute on his 172. Anecdotal, but I know that one worked.
 
Anecdotal, but I know that one worked.

This is a point worth emphasizing I think--parachutes are an incredibly reliable device. They are super simple and inherently "want" to open. It's as simple as throwing a bed sheet into the wind. There is a reason NASA uses them to deliver space capsules to the surface of planets and fighter pilots have them connected to ejection seats. When it all hits the fan, a parachute is the most likely thing to work.

Most of the problems people imagine originate in sport skydiving. Having a parachute not open or become uncontrollable generally happens when a rig is either packed incorrectly or has been designed with something other than strictly safety in mind (for instance, designing maneuverability over safety). Get a system designed solely for safety, then packed by professionals? It's going to work darn near every time.

The key is getting the operator to deploy the system. Think about that next time you're considering pulling the red handle.
 
Being a guy who used to hate Cirrus, and now fly's one almost every day, I can see the ignorance of your post. Why would you not want to pull the chute? Chances are, in an off airport landing, the airplane WILL be bought by the insurance company. Not to mention that the majority of off airport landings end in injury/fatality. I hope this doesn't bring up any sting for any one, but look at Ben's accident. Had he been in a Cirrus, or something equiped with a chute, I think the outcome would have been different. The statistics are there if you just look for them. Remember, this is from a former Cirrus hater. Just do some searching through my history, and you'll see. Education is the cure for ignorance.

Lets look at what happened here as well. The engine was having trouble. There was no runway within resonable distance. The thickness of the ice was uncertian because last year at this time it was gone. So attempting a landing in uncertian conditions, that you have no clue if the ice will support the airplane at a forward speen of 65-75 knots and possibly going through the ice at that speed, or descending under chute, I pick the chute because it's going to give me the best chance of survival. And that's what the chute is all about. Giving you the best chance of survival. Airplane be damned. If I ever have an issue in an airplane with a chute, I'm going to fly it over the field I would land in if I had no chite, and pull. Flying airplanes is not about saving equipment in an emergency, it's about saving lives. There have been plenty of guys who should have pulled the chute, and didn't, and didn't make it. The outcome would have been different had they pulled. And there have been a few fatalities where the chute was pulled, but the majority were from pulls outside of the airplanes envelope, and outside of the chutes demonstrated capibilities. Operate anythinf outside of it's demonstrated limits, and you don't know whats going to happen.

Without being too much of a dick, do you actually have facts to back up the above statements? How many off airport landings are there, and how many of them are fatal? Also, whereas one can speculate about how those that survived a landing under the chute would have surely been killed had they attempted a conventional emergency landing, no one knows what the outcome would have been. Likewise, we can't know whether a fatal crash landing would have been averted with a parachute.

The problem I have with the "pro-chute" crowd is the extremists. There have been several successful off airport landings in Cirrus where there was little to no damage, and the pilot has been ostracized by some for not pulling the chute. Much like it is somewhat difficult to criticize an outcome where people have walked away unharmed (as in the topic of this thread) I find it even more reprehensible to attack an arguably more successful outcome.

I think the logic about the unknown thickness of the ice is somewhat flawed. You're more likely to break through the ice under the canopy than you are with a controlled descent. One can touch down at a much lower rate of descent when landing than coming straight down. Other than that, I don't know any of the details of this crash...weather, pilot experience, the circumstances that led to the decision to pull etc. I have no cause to second guess this. Whether I may have made a different choice, I can't know without having been there, or at least knowing more.

One thing to consider in the decision matrix that appears to be glossed over in this thread: pulling the chute does not guarantee a particular outcome. In the quoted post above, "The outcome would have been different had they pulled." The parachute likely leads to a safe(ish) arrival with the ground, but it is not a guarantee. Personally for me, to quote Bob Hoover, I'm going to fly the airplane as far into the crash as possible. Pulling the chute cedes control of the airplane to God and the wind. If the airplane is unflyable, I'll pull no questions asked. Having the chute is another tool that can turn an untenable situation for most airplanes into something with a greater chance of success in a Cirrus.

The unfortunate aspect having a chute is the effect it can have on decision making. While I doubt most professional caliber pilots are likely to use the chute as a crutch or escape route for flying in conditions they otherwise wouldn't, Cirrus aircraft aren't marketed to the professional pilot. They are marketed to those who have the $750,000 it costs to buy a new one. It is marketed as an airplane with an incredible safety device, that many substitute for good judgement. There are numerous stories of safe, under canopy landings, that while successful, led me to wonder why the airplane was flying in those conditions in the first place. I readily admit that I have no data to back up my belief that the chute instills a false sense of security in some, but the anecdotal evidence points to it happening. Whether the number of people endangered (or killed) outweighs the number saved by use of the chute, I don't know.

So long as people don't use the chute as a crutch, or as a substitute for good judgement, I don't have a problem with it and see it as a good safety device.

To answer the post about the flap hanging in the picture...my guess is that is broke from the pushrod during the "landing." It is my understanding that it is a somewhat violent collision with the earth under the chute. Note the missing wheel pants and main gear strut fairings as well.
 
So long as people don't use the chute as a crutch, or as a substitute for good judgement, I don't have a problem with it and see it as a good safety device.

I consider pulling the chute to be good decision making. I sure hope you don't use weather radar, ice protection, or stall horns as I wouldn't want them to cloud your good judgement or use them as a crutch.
 
I consider pulling the chute to be good decision making. I sure hope you don't use weather radar, ice protection, or stall horns as I wouldn't want them to cloud your good judgement or use them as a crutch.
The chute debate is a helluva debate. One which interests me very much. Clearly strong opinions on both sides.

I recall a conversation about this, and we focused on this- does the chute cause people to fly or make decisions differently? One side side said yes, and that's bad. The other said yes, that's why we have all kinds of equipment on the plane-each item has the potential to increase the utility of the aircraft.

I will say, it seems to me that the Cirri are probably too much airplane for a number of the folks flying them..that is a lot of money, not much flying experience. I believe there
are many articles in magazines discussing the same thing, but I have no links.
 
block30 said:
I will say, it seems to me that the Cirri are probably too much airplane for a number of the folks flying them..that is a lot of money, not much flying experience.

You hit the nail squarely on the head.
 
I consider pulling the chute to be good decision making. I sure hope you don't use weather radar, ice protection, or stall horns as I wouldn't want them to cloud your good judgement or use them as a crutch.

Way to miss the entire point. Did you actually read my post? I never said the decision to pull the chute is bad judgement, and I wasn't judging this particular pull. I think I was clear in stating that with the facts I currently have reviewed, I don't know if I would have pulled or not.

As far as it being a crutch:
The chute is a tool. Undue emphasis or import is placed on it. It is sold as the ultimate in safety. Unfortunately, people can rely on it as a failsafe, which is not the intended use. I don't like reading accident reports where the chute saved lives that should never have been risked in the first place. There are too many instances where we can applaud a pilot being "man enough" to pull the chute, where instead we should be asking why they were in that situation to begin with. That is what I'm talking about when I say it's a crutch or can lead to poor judgement, or it is used in lieu of sound judgment.



Sent from my DROID RAZR using Tapatalk 2
 
Way to miss the entire point. Did you actually read my post? I never said the decision to pull the chute is bad judgement, and I wasn't judging this particular pull. I think I was clear in stating that with the facts I currently have reviewed, I don't know if I would have pulled or not.

As far as it being a crutch:
The chute is a tool. Undue emphasis or import is placed on it. It is sold as the ultimate in safety. Unfortunately, people can rely on it as a failsafe, which is not the intended use. I don't like reading accident reports where the chute saved lives that should never have been risked in the first place. There are too many instances where we can applaud a pilot being "man enough" to pull the chute, where instead we should be asking why they were in that situation to begin with. That is what I'm talking about when I say it's a crutch or can lead to poor judgement, or it is used in lieu of sound judgment.



Sent from my DROID RAZR using Tapatalk 2


Fair enough, I'll admit I didn't read all seven paragraphs and skipped to the end. Ma bad. Re-reading that section then I would agree it may cause people to take chances they otherwise wouldn't have taken.
 
Thanks for your reply. Do you know what caused him to pull the chute?

Engine failure shortly after takeoff. The plane had been in for major maintenance (had the chute installed during the downtime), and the fuel selector was found in the off position. I still don't know how that happens. The times I've tried it to see how it could happen, the plane cranked, ran at idle for seconds, and quit.
 
Engine failure shortly after takeoff. The plane had been in for major maintenance (had the chute installed during the downtime), and the fuel selector was found in the off position. I still don't know how that happens. The times I've tried it to see how it could happen, the plane cranked, ran at idle for seconds, and quit.

I still don't know how this happens either. I have always wondered if on certain fuel systems, off doesn't "close the hole" all of the way to to speak. Maybe enough gets passed the shutoff valve to sustain idle, and even a run up. While others dont.
 
I still don't know how this happens either. I have always wondered if on certain fuel systems, off doesn't "close the hole" all of the way to to speak. Maybe enough gets passed the shutoff valve to sustain idle, and even a run up. While others dont.

Maybe. But I know on the 152, 172s, 182s, and 210s I've tried it on, there just isn't any way. Maybe some of them get loose with age or people aren't getting them all the way in the "OFF" position.
 
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