Airbus is getting rather nasty

[Boris Badenov]

You don't have to choose between piloting skills and safer automation. We should have both.

I dig what you're saying here. But I will make the argument that there are times the automation actually decreases or contravenes the skill. On those occasions, I'd like for us to revert to trusting the skill and experience.

To wit, automation is a great failsafe and backup to skill and experience. But the cart can only have one horse, and that horse is called....a HORSE. No, no wait. A PILOT.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

But I will make the argument that there are times the automation actually decreases or contravenes the skill.

I think that's only true when a pilot allows his skills to atrophy. Otherwise, the automation is just a tool and a failsafe, not a crutch. Any of us can make mistakes. I've seen some incredible pilots forget to stow the speed brakes, for example. The automation is there to save your (and the passengers') butts when a simple mistake happens. While it's obviously true that the pilot in the Buffalo accident was not God's gift to aviation, his mistake could have happened to any of us under the right circumstances. The automation is there to protect everyone in those cases. Weeding out the bad pilots is a separate issue.

 

[Boris Badenov]

his mistake could have happened to any of us under the right circumstances.

Again, agree with your general gist, but I can't imagine the circumstance under which "his mistake" would have happened to me or most pilots I know. And I'm not infallible (although I am on the internet). But that sort of mistake, IMHO, isn't a "there but for the grace of the Sky Bully go I" mistake. It's a "WTF, who signed this guy's ticket?" mistake. Engineers are amazing creatures, but they can't protect us from a poorly trained, inept, or simply stupid pilot. That's why they still pay us (a little).

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

I disagree. Again, I'm only dealing with the actual initial chain that lead to the accident, which was the loss of airspeed. I see this happen to guys all the time. You're flying at 250 knots on vectors to an approach and doing a descent. ATC tells you to slow to 180 when you level off, so the throttles stay at idle to deplete the speed. Then, you get distracted with one thing or another. Maybe the FAs call, maybe the ACARS dings, whatever. While you're dealing with this for a few seconds, it slips your mind that the throttles were left at idle to slow to the assigned speed. Usually, you'll look back at the ASI before it gets too slow. But occasionally I've seen guys forget just a few seconds too long, and they need to be reminded. So, typically the situation is resolved by the two-person crew with one person backing up the other. But that tiny percent of the time that both are distracted, low speed protection with autothrottles prevents a real problem. And anyone who says that this can't happen to them is just not being honest.

 

[Boris Badenov]

*shrug*. Dunno. Closing in on 7000 hours as the boss, the head man, the top dog, the big cheese, the head honcho, number one, most of it by my lil ole lonesome, and I've never gotten anywhere near stalling the aircraft because I forgot where the levers were. There is still such a thing as "aptitude".

Mind you, I've made plenty of OTHER mistakes. Some of which could conceivably have been fatal, if the other circumstances had been right. But forgetting whether or not you're going fast enough to sustain gravity-defiance? That seems pretty Basic.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

I can only tell you what I've seen, and I've seen it many times. Some people are more susceptible to a certain mistake than others. I guess you're just an ace when it comes to this one. Other pilots? Not so much. And it's not because they're bad pilots. It's because they're human.

 

[Boris Badenov]

It's because they're human.

I don't think their inability to fly an airplane makes them Lesser Lifeforms. Hell, they might cure cancer or invent the longer-lasting lightbulb and be of much greater stature in Posterity than I. I do think, though, that if one can't keep the airplane from falling out of the sky because one is unable to monitor the aircraft's speed, one might consider taking up another line of work.

In any case, Merry Christmas, ATN. You know that it's essentially a Pagan, Germanic Holiday, right? BRING FORTH THE RITUAL SACRIFICES!

 

[Seggy]

*shrug*. Dunno. Closing in on 7000 hours as the boss, the head man, the top dog, the big cheese, the head honcho, number one, most of it by my lil ole lonesome, and I've never gotten anywhere near stalling the aircraft because I forgot where the levers were. There is still such a thing as "aptitude".

How do you know it won't happen at 7001 hours though? Ignorance on your part if you think it can't happen to you.

 

[Seggy]

U mad bro?

Nope

 

[Seggy]

He's very mad that I returned. It further enraged him that when I was banned it was only temporary. He said I "wasn't one of you". My presence irritates him.

Don't think so highly of yourself.

 

[Boris Badenov]

How do you know it won't happen at 7001 hours though? Ignorance on your part if you think it can't happen to you.

My callsign is "Maverick". Nuff said.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

My callsign is "Maverick". Nuff said.

You're dangerous.

 

[seagull]

The FBW system is different on the 777. The AB philosophy is hard limits and the Boeing soft limits. That philosophy extends into what Boeing believes with the pilot's level of control authority. AB FBW has full control authority and prevents the pilots from making an input controls that would put the aircraft outside it's normal flight envelope. The 777 FBW is not full or complete authority and allows the pilots to fly outside of it's normal envelope.

Not quite true. In order to maneuver past certain limits (which are, incidentally, a LOT lower than the Airbus numbers), you need to apply a LOT of force. You can also, very easily exceed the Airbus limits by turning off the paddle switches. As I recall, the Boeing number is 40 degrees of bank, the Airbus is 60.

What you wrote did once apply to the 777, but they changed the software about 10 years ago in response to a CAST recommendation.

Boeing also believes that that having the more conventional yoke and and column, gives pilots a more realistic feel and feedback of aircraft control. Many pilots believe that they should have the final control of the aircraft. Some pilots like the AB computer controlled protections. And as we know, there are limitations on computer controlled systems and especially if the systems become compromised and "confused". (AF447)

Not quite. The amount of control movement that happened in 447 was just enough to change the pitch 12 degrees over 20 seconds at FL 350. How much control column movement would that take? I would bet you that it is not enough for you to even notice! The Airbus, though ,has an ECAM message that tells you that the other pilot is manipulating the controls, so in actual fact, the inceptor design in the Airbus actually provides the more salient cue in this scenario.

The main concern with full automation, is will pilots become more complacent and rely on on automatics, have less hands on flying experience and in some dire emergency be unable to cope and have less situational awareness? This is the balance that is constantly being sought out between man and their machines. For Boeing, the pilot is always the entity in control and the one who makes the final decisions. Also are not the Boeing controls linked and backdriven so that you can see what is being commanded of the aircraft which gives you the ability to see what the other pilot is doing and what the autopilot is attempting to do? It seems to me IMO, that the Boeing FBW is more transparent. Again, IMO, I like that Boeing allows a greater degree of human intervention.

Also on the 777, when one control yoke is moved by a crew member, the other yoke moves as well. If the autopilot is flying the plane, both yokes will reflect the autopilot's control inputs. Even if the flight crew is busy with charts or messing with the radios, the movement of the yokes in front of them will provide a continuous visual indication of what the autopilot is doing. If the captain is flying manually and the first officer suddenly has to take over or become involved in the control of the airplane, he probably will already have a sense of what's going on control-wise from the movements the yoke has been making in front of him. It's an awareness thing, and can be a critical factor in an emergency situation.

Mixed bag, as explained above.

Side sticks do not provide this level of crew awareness. The movement of one stick does not move the other one, hence the non-flying crew member will not be aware of the other person's, or the autopilot's, control inputs other than by instrument indications and by what the airplane is actually doing. Even if the side sticks did move together, their location puts them outside the "awareness bubble" of a non-flying crew member if he's involved with instruments or controls in the center of the panel or on the aisle stand.

Same same.

And, the Boeing philosophy extends to the throttles. When the engines on a Boeing plane are being controlled by the auto-throttle, the power levers on the aisle stand move to reflect the action of the auto-throttle. The auto-throttle on an Airbus does not move the power levers. They simply remain in the last place they were positioned before the auto-throttle took over. It's that awareness thing again. If the flight control computers determine a power application is needed during some phase of the flight, Boeing pilots will see their power levers move up the quadrant. The only indication Airbus pilots will have is the acceleration of the airplane, possibly the sound of the engines spooling up, and the readings of the engine instruments. In a high-stress, high distraction environment, on final in severe turbulence, for example,these are all things that could be overlooked for several critical moments. That's not to say it's impossible for Boeing pilots to overlook the action of an auto-throttle, but at least they've got some big levers moving under their noses to indicate what's going on.

None of the above may matter to many pilots, but to many others, it will. Just some thoughts.

I would prefer throttles to move also, but it turns out to not be as much of a big deal as some make it.

How much Airbus FBW time and Boeing FBW time do you have?

 

[A Life Aloft]

No AB time at all. No 777 time either. Just my thoughts and opinions, based on my own past experience, what I have read and studied and from pilots that I know who do or have flown AB aircraft, conversations with triple 7 pilots, and what I believe regarding certain automation features, my philosophies, preferences and what I have personally learned about how and why Boeing designs these features. YMMV.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

Not quite. The amount of control movement that happened in 447 was just enough to change the pitch 12 degrees over 20 seconds at FL 350. How much control column movement would that take? I would bet you that it is not enough for you to even notice! The Airbus, though ,has an ECAM message that tells you that the other pilot is manipulating the controls, so in actual fact, the inceptor design in the Airbus actually provides the more salient cue in this scenario.

Eh, the FWC will hollar "DUAL INPUT." I don't have it right in front of me (I have better things to do at the moment) but I seem to recall that this was an added warning.

(Zero 'bus FBW time here too (yet); my information on it is from a human factors/computer science perspective.)

 

[seagull]

No AB time at all. No 777 time either. Just my thoughts and opinions, based on my own past experience, what I have read and studied and from pilots that I know who do or have flown AB aircraft, conversations with triple 7 pilots, and what I believe regarding certain automation features, my philosophies, preferences and what I have personally learned about how and why Boeing designs these features. YMMV.

Pilots flying aircraft often have little clue, though. For example, how many MD-11 pilots actually think the elevator is less effective in the -11 compared to the -10? Unfortunately, the answer is "most", and it is flat out incorrect.

 

[Richman]

Who the fark cares? It's not like any of us are writing the check.

What's the pay and the QoL? Anything else just doesn't matter.

Don't pretend the name is on the A/W Cert matters to you, either, 'cause it doesn't. Y'all will be the first little piggies on the bid list for one or the other if it pays $10/hr more.

Richman

 

[WacoFan]

Don't think so highly of yourself.

Ok. But only cause you said so.

 

[Springer]

No AB time at all. No 777 time either. Just my thoughts and opinions, based on my own past experience. YMMV.

Based on your statement, you have zero experience and therefore zero credibility.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

Based on your statement, you have zero experience and therefore zero credibility.

Actually, he has a lot of experience in Boeings, so I think his credibility is quite high. Someone can comment on flight control philosophy without having flown a certain aircraft.