Another knee jerk reaction to the Colgan crash

[Cav]

I concur....

The training department should have heads rolling(even though they will no longer exist after May 8th). It is up to the training department to have the curriculum and staff to let let those people through. Marvin ins't soley responsible for that crash because that was a 2 pilot airplane with 0 competent pilots upfront. And maybe it comes full circle to the FAA and the POI for signing off the certificate with that type of training approved?

The biggest problem I saw with training at the regional level was that there was a lot more checking going on than training. It was box checking on a piece of paper as quickly and cheaply as possible. Just enough not to require someone to be forced into additional training. There were obvious exceptions along the way but that was the feeling I got.

When I moved on it was night and day different. When I looked at the training syllabus it was "holy I get X number of sims to figure this thing out!? Sweet!"

So my point is that the system failed completely in the Colgan case. The screening of applicants, the crew, the instructors, the FAA standards and minimum training requirements, the POI, the list of those responsible is endless.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

I think having the elevator pulled back to the stops probably sealed their doom. On our aircraft, you put flaps up during the stall recovery and it won't seal anything except for a positive rate of climb.

Also, the power levers were firewalled.

Yes, once the shaker activated, the power levers were advanced rapidly to rating, in accordance with Colgan's (deficient, see NTSB at 35-38) approach-to-stall and recovery technique, yes. And the condition levers were set to max at gear extension, which is probably in accordance with Colgan's SOP. To me, the fact that the flaps were improperly retracted is irrelevant: you still have to reduce the angle of attack to recover.

If the training was different, this might not have happened. If the first officer had gone John Wayne, this might not have happened. But, it's stupid to sit here and think of any of that - a pointless exercise, except for one salient fact that keeps me up at night. The last link in the accident chain.

The most frustrating part of the whole affair to me, especially considering the regulatory reactions to the accident: All they had to do was push. Hell, they could have just let go and let the airplane do the pushing!

(Those who have met me in person, please read the above two sentences in my most agitated tones.)

The difference between a carpet dance/interesting incident ("Why did you stall the airplane, Captain?") and tragic accident came down to simply flying the airplane. Airliners are still airplanes, despite the fact that the interior looks like a well-appointed transcontinental bus.

 

[C150J]

Three points:

1. It is surprising to know that data used to be flushed from a pilot's record after a period of time. In the military, everything I've done from Day 1 is in my records, and available for review by anyone. From an outsider's point of view, the potential problems with flushing the records after a certain amount of time means that there's no ability to see a track record in a pilot's history. If we're willing to go market ourselves on hours in our logbook that go back to the beginning, then there's no reason that the "bad marks" shouldn't also go back that far.

2. Airlines might use the knowledge of this record to decide whom they hire, but they haven't yet. Ya know what? OF COURSE THEY SHOULD let that information impact who they hire. Again, it's all part of the pilot's history and experience. Might they have a kneejerk reaction and let failures from long in the past affect their decisions? Yep. Would that be unfair? Yep. Would that suck? Yep. Which leads me to....

3. Life isn't fair.

Life certainly isn't fair and airlines should use the info, I agree. That being said, how "identical" was your training in UPT to one of your cohorts? I could be wrong, but I'd be shocked if the differences in training and testing are as substantial as they are in the general aviation realm. This all reminds me of local law enforcement: if you're a proactive/effective police officer, you will have complaints in your jacket. Regardless of their validity, they will effect your promotion potential. So, the "lumps" who hid on patrol usually promote instead of the guy who put his/her neck out.

 

[Firebird2XC]

The way we do business is evolving. Arguably for the better. No matter how it came about, only time will tell us if it helps or hinders us in our pursuit of greater safety.
Are we so quick to cry foul when the light of scrutiny and truth is cast our way? I think it's interesting and somewhat humbling to note how quickly pilots turn hypocritical and say that change is no longer required when it affects us personally.

Aviation is constantly learning, growing, and evolving. Our understanding of safety and how we operate must do so as well. It's painful but necessary. Pilots have so long been viewed as beyond human that admitting it seems like admitting defeat. As we admit our imperfections, we are better able to overcome them. Nobody's above that. Who knows- perhaps the blemish on your record today becomes the common failing of all pilots tomorrow.

Fearing that we won't live up to the expectations of others is pointless. Expectations are just problems we make for ourselves about things that haven't happened yet. Having expectations about expectations would likely just drive people crazy. Learn from your mistakes. Own them. Then move past them.

 

[Rocketman99]

I think having the elevator pulled back to the stops probably sealed their doom. On our aircraft, you put flaps up during the stall recovery and it won't seal anything except for a positive rate of climb.

Also, the power levers were firewalled.

We've all got opinions on this one, but let's get the facts straight. Nobody is going to power their way out of a stall with the elevator at the back stop and full power unless you're in an F-15, and if you're tired enough, you might not think about shoving the yoke forward on the skipper.

Should she of? Yes, but let's not split hairs, the captain was the one flying the aircraft, the captain was the one that didn't bring the power up, and the captain was the one that didn't get the stall recovery yet.

Yes, once the shaker activated, the power levers were advanced rapidly to rating, in accordance with Colgan's (deficient, see NTSB at 35-38) approach-to-stall and recovery technique, yes. And the condition levers were set to max at gear extension, which is probably in accordance with Colgan's SOP. To me, the fact that the flaps were improperly retracted is irrelevant: you still have to reduce the angle of attack to recover.
The most frustrating part of the whole affair to me, especially considering the regulatory reactions to the accident: All they had to do was push. Hell, they could have just let go and let the airplane do the pushing!

Actually, the power levers were not remotely firewalled. They also were not even close to the rating detent. They were only ever pushed up to about 70 or 75%, well below the rating detent in that situation. Had they ever actually pushed the power up to the detent they very likely would have immediately recovered (perhaps not with the yoke fully aft to the stop, I'd have to try it in the sim but they also don't necessarily accurately model transport category aircraft in the stall regime). Yes, there is that much excess power available in the Q, it definitely is one seriously overpowered airplane.

So if any one of two things had happened at the specific time of the incident I wouldn't have lost coworkers:
1) power to detent
2) not pulling back all the way on the yoke

Also, not having that (IMO useless, but my opinion and 7 bucks will get you a latte at Starbucks) ref speeds switch on would have given them another 20 kts of airspeed decay prior to shaker to realize they were getting slow.

Anyway, back on topic, I'm mostly in favor of this new policy. I like that you can establish a true history from day one to present for a pilot. However, I don't like the idea that something that may be on your record for a shady reason may potentially keep you from a job. Some people would unjustly get screwed. Then again, as Hacker said, life isn't fair. In the end we all have to play the hand we're dealt.

 

[TUCKnTRUCK]

Actually, the power levers were not remotely firewalled. They also were not even close to the rating detent. They were only ever pushed up to about 70 or 75%, well below the rating detent in that situation.

keep in mind, the NTSB animation doesn't show the over travel region of the fadec, on top of the rating detent, they had an additional 33% available from each engine... so in reality, they were at 60% less than what the engines "could" have given them. Firewall in the Q means 133% power, props automatically go to max, and the plane seriously gets up and goes. If you hit full over travel with any flaps deployed you will overspeed the flaps... even at 30deg nose up pitch.

 

[granlistillo]

I think having the elevator pulled back to the stops probably sealed their doom. On our aircraft, you put flaps up during the stall recovery and it won't seal anything except for a positive rate of climb.

Also, the power levers were firewalled.


We've all got opinions on this one, but let's get the facts straight. Nobody is going to power their way out of a stall with the elevator at the back stop and full power unless you're in an F-15, and if you're tired enough, you might not think about shoving the yoke forward on the skipper.

Should she of? Yes, but let's not split hairs, the captain was the one flying the aircraft, the captain was the one that didn't bring the power up, and the captain was the one that didn't get the stall recovery yet.

I think she should have called it out and if he didn't react firewalled it way before the shaker, when that little trend arrow was dropping like a rock. Pulling up the flaps in that hair ball?? From the first notch ? Uncommanded so the PF wouldn't note the pitch moments? Are you claiming that is good technique? Is that what she was taught? Maybe you have been out of flying for a while, but there is a heck of a lot of difference between the first notch and full flaps. There was nothing to be gained by that, and it didn't help matters.

Power, lower the nose seems to be the best technique besides stall avoidance.
Anyway, she didn't do her job correctly. Not even close.
I think they were both fatigued, and I can see it happening. It can creep up on anybody.

 

[jtrain609]

I think she should have called it out and if he didn't react firewalled it way before the shaker, when that little trend arrow was dropping like a rock. Pulling up the flaps in that hair ball?? From the first notch ? Uncommanded so the PF wouldn't note the pitch moments? Are you claiming that is good technique? Is that what she was taught? Maybe you have been out of flying for a while, but there is a heck of a lot of difference between the first notch and full flaps. There was nothing to be gained by that, and it didn't help matters.

Power, lower the nose seems to be the best technique besides stall avoidance.
Anyway, she didn't do her job correctly. Not even close.
I think they were both fatigued, and I can see it happening. It can creep up on anybody.

I think we're talking past each other. They were at flaps 15.

 

[Orange Anchor]

I think she should have called it out and if he didn't react firewalled it way before the shaker, when that little trend arrow was dropping like a rock. Pulling up the flaps in that hair ball?? From the first notch ? Uncommanded so the PF wouldn't note the pitch moments? Are you claiming that is good technique? Is that what she was taught? Maybe you have been out of flying for a while, but there is a heck of a lot of difference between the first notch and full flaps. There was nothing to be gained by that, and it didn't help matters.

Again, the 'startle effect'. People are surprised and revert. Plus didn't the crews view the NASA Twotter tailplane stall video, something the Q is not susceptible to? Improper training again?

Power, lower the nose seems to be the best technique besides stall avoidance.
Anyway, she didn't do her job correctly. Not even close.
I think they were both fatigued, and I can see it happening. It can creep up on anybody.

Actually the lead people at various facilities including the test pilot school at Mojave and CAE in Dallas in their training are going back to the old way of FIRST reduce angle of attack and then add power. The change in training came with the jets and people decided we could just power out of stalls. That is a bad idea to buy into. There have been incidents where people relied mostly on power to get out of the stall (or approach to stall) and power has been insufficient. Incidents including heavy airplanes descending at high altitude with power in idle. They add power but there is insufficient thrust to power out.
On other points, yes it is hard to understand how someone can sit and watch the red ladder climb so rapidly on the PFD but watching the animation, IT HAPPENED. We are left with no explanation and saying they lost SA or some other comment does NOT explain WHY. We, of course, have the ability to replay the video and with each viewing we may become a bit more distant from seeing ourselves in any similar situation. But anyone who has had a real emergency, an engine quit at a really bad time, a gear failure or such will tell you.. there is a year compressed into a few seconds where you are thinking, "WTF!!!! YGBSM!!!!" before training kicks in.

 

[C150J]

Having co-managed a safety program for the last 3.5 years, I still question the effectiveness of what this will most likely cause (a pre-screening litmus test, before one can even be evaluated in person). The underlying problem of inadequate/inconsistent training and testing at the primary level is the real killer. Weak TERPS knowledge (after all, most CFIIs have minimal real-world experience - I sure didn't), minimally/selectively-enforced PTS standards, and a smorgasbord of non-standardized training options continue to cause pilot deviations on a monthly basis.

In no way am I saying that we should hire a genuine poor-performer. However, until we fix the real problem this will mask most candidates' competence, as most will seek methods of training where record-keeping is internal or a DPE that is known to be a Santa Claus. Also, will this shy people away from seeking additional ratings that aren't required, as it opens them for additional liability?

Firebird - I completely agree with your comments. I just wish HR and legal departments could realize that people actually learn from their mistakes (as you stated): it seems more and more are just taking the liability avenue.

 

[Orange Anchor]

. I just wish HR and legal departments could realize that people actually learn from their mistakes (as you stated): it seems more and more are just taking the liability avenue.

That is not going to happen until Congress legislates that info from FOQA and ASAPs can not be used for discovery and in litigation. It is like the recent hubbub about controller errors doubling in the last year. The mistaken idea was there was a new problem. Not so. Just that with better reporting and some new policies that removed the punitive aspects of reporting fielded more reports. The errors were most likely there all along, just not identified or documented. You can't fix a problem that no one admits exists.

 

[Hacker15e]

it seems more and more are just taking the liability avenue.

For a business, what is wrong with that?

Outside of the potential for a few pilots to be possibly unfairly painted with a broad brush, what is the actual negative impact?

 

[C150J]

For a business, what is wrong with that?

Outside of the potential for a few pilots to be possibly unfairly painted with a broad brush, what is the actual negative impact?

The actual negative impact is hiring the wrong people, fostering inappropriate training environments, and possibly doing nothing to improve safety.

Edited to add: I would be a complete advocate of this kind of quick-response database if it accurately depicted someone's training history. As it stands now, there are far too many variables to make a judgement based on check ride failures alone. I fear that most companies won't go beyond it, triggering prospective pilots to attend "you can't officially fail" flight schools, creating an even bigger problem.

If the FAA and every DPE held everyone to the same standards, this would be a step into the 21st century (after all, every airline has already had the opportunity to retrieve an 8060-68 for some time now... this is just quick access).

 

[Rocketman99]

keep in mind, the NTSB animation doesn't show the over travel region of the fadec, on top of the rating detent, they had an additional 33% available from each engine... so in reality, they were at 60% less than what the engines "could" have given them. Firewall in the Q means 133% power, props automatically go to max, and the plane seriously gets up and goes. If you hit full over travel with any flaps deployed you will overspeed the flaps... even at 30deg nose up pitch.

Totally man. I was trying to make the point that just the detent would have been enough and they unfortunately never got there. I know the specifics...I was on the team.

 

[Hacker15e]

too many variables to make a judgement based on check ride failures alone. I fear that most companies won't go beyond it,

While I share your opinion that there are too many variables, it's simply begging the question to automatically assume that there's going to be judgments on pilot hiring "based on check ride failures alone".

Airlines don't currently hire based on one single factor (nor is there even one single "most important" factor), so I don't see any reason to believe that the addition of this information into the pilot applicant's profile would cause them to so drastically change the way they evaluate prospective new-hires. It's just one more piece of information to help paint the overall picture.

Railing against it is maneuvering against a phantom bandit. We don't know if it's actually going to be an issue or not, or if it's going to cause the "wrong" people to get hired.

 

[C150J]

While I share your opinion that there are too many variables, it's simply begging the question to automatically assume that there's going to be judgments on pilot hiring "based on check ride failures alone".

I agree, and certainly hope you're right! That being said, I can tell you that at least one airline is planning on using this as a hire/no-hire tool early on in the process. My opinions might be premature, as I've seen what it's done to law enforcement. That being said, I would never want to work at those departments! To your credit, flight management at a very popular 737 operator told me recently that "we don't ever intend on hiring a perfect pilot!"

 

[Gonzo]

While I share your opinion that there are too many variables, it's simply begging the question to automatically assume that there's going to be judgments on pilot hiring "based on check ride failures alone".

Airlines don't currently hire based on one single factor (nor is there even one single "most important" factor), so I don't see any reason to believe that the addition of this information into the pilot applicant's profile would cause them to so drastically change the way they evaluate prospective new-hires. It's just one more piece of information to help paint the overall picture.

Railing against it is maneuvering against a phantom bandit. We don't know if it's actually going to be an issue or not, or if it's going to cause the "wrong" people to get hired.

But airlines are currently not hiring based on one factor(busted checkrides).

I couldn't get hired at my airline right now because I didn't do clearing turns on my VMC demo on one checkride and I turned crosswind to low on a different one. Who cares that I have passed every 121(2 SIC rides and 3 PCs) checking event and in fact never so much had to retrain on anything. My fear is I might be Eagle for life because of my part 61 busts.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

But airlines are currently not hiring based on one factor(busted checkrides).

I couldn't get hired at my airline right now because I didn't do clearing turns on my VMC demo on one checkride and I turned crosswind to low on a different one. Who cares that I have passed every 121(2 SIC rides and 3 PCs) checking event and in fact never so much had to retrain on anything. My fear is I might be Eagle for life because of my part 61 busts.

What's worse is that you're not likely to make those mistakes again. Nobody hurt, and you were all "Oh yeah - not gonna do it that way next time!"

In other words, you learned. Which is, after all, the point. If you stop making and catching mistakes, that's when you're doomed.

 

[C150J]

What's worse is that you're not likely to make those mistakes again. Nobody hurt, and you were all "Oh yeah - not gonna do it that way next time!"

In other words, you learned. Which is, after all, the point. If you stop making and catching mistakes, that's when you're doomed.

And that's what's ultimately frustrating. The common errors leading to busts on primary check rides don't necessarily correlate to pilot deviations, incidents, and accidents. For the commercial check ride, a LOFT scenario involving diversions, fuel constraints, and instrument procedures would have much higher content validity than a lazy eight. Also, for the ATP written, I'd much rather see questions concerning readback/hearback errors than how to load a 727.

Also, had Gonzo gone to a Part 141 school with self-examining authority, he would have one reportable failed check ride at most. He could've hooked every ride once, paid up, and graduated the program with NO reportable failures. Blows my mind. For those of you who attended such programs, I'm aware that some are much better than others, so please don't take that statement as a jab. I'm first to admit that part 61 has its flaws too (e.g., having an uncle as your DPE from private through ATP).

I'm done venting, I promise.

 

[Hacker15e]

But airlines are currently not hiring based on one factor(busted checkrides).

I couldn't get hired at my airline right now because....

A sample size of one is nowhere near a trend.